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Philip C. Jessup 
I think in approaching the subject of 
Jurisdiction it is pertinent to note that 
anyone exercising authority of the 
United States Government is from time 
to time necessarily concerned with 
problems of jurisdiction. Within the 
limits of authority entrusted to you, 
where can you exercise that authority, 
over whom, with respect to what 
actions or events? And, reciprocally, 
what are the limits of the power and 
rightful authority of the representative, 
or officer, of another government with 
respect to you, your ship, or personnel 
under your command? 
I think that we are concerned par-
ticularly with the exercise of power, or 
authority, or jurisdiction at sea, and 
over ships and persons on ships. But, 
first, we need to get some general 
propositions in mind. I think it may be 
convenient for you ifI suggest the order 
in which I intend to take up various 
topics. 
First, some general observations on 
the nature of jurisdiction and what that 
means; second, the international law 
limits on jurisdiction; third, the general 
bases of jurisdiction which are accepted 
in international law; fourth, passing 
from there, to exceptions or immunities 
to normal jurisdiction; fifth, taking up 
specifically jurisdiction over persons; 
and, sixth, jurisdiction over places. Our 
consideration of jurisdiction over places 
leads us to a consideration of territorial 
waters and jurisdiction on the high 
seas-including, particularly, the prob-
lems arising in contiguous waters, in-
cluding the continental shelf. Then, I 
shall pass back to some specific con-
siderations of jurisdiction over ships-
including ships in port, in territorial 
waters, and on the high seas. Finally, I 
shall deal with the question of jurisdic-
tion within the air space. 
First, then, as to a general idea of the 
nature of jurisdiction, or what it means. 
It has frequently been explained as "the 
power to speak the law," to tell what 
the law is, what law or rule applies to 
whom, in what place, and in regard to 
what acts or events. We have the same 
problem within our domestic organiza-
tional systems. We have problems of 
jurisdiction as to the Town of Newport, 
the State of Rhode Island, and the 
Federal authorities, in regard to various 
events which may happen in this im-
mediate community. 
I thilik, also, that you may look at 
jurisdiction in terms of the three 
branches of Government which exercise 
it. First, one speaks of legislative juris-
diction, which is the power of the 
Congress to lay down a rule. For in-
stance, Congress passed a law pro-
hibiting the transportation of liquor in 
American territory during the era of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. Second, you 
have judicial jurisdiction, which is the 
power of the court to determine what 
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are the rights or liabilities. For instance, 
the court entertains a libel of a ship 
seized for bootlegging and imposes a 
fine, or other penalty, if it finds that the 
statute has been violated. In the third 
place you have executive jurisdiction; 
that is, the power of the Executive 
Branch of the Government to carry out 
the law and to provide its impact upon 
the individual or thing. For example-
here, again, keeping within the realm of 
the prohibition laws for a convenient 
example-the Coast Guard seizes a ship 
hovering off the United States coast 
with intent to smuggle alcoholic liquors 
into the United States. 
Granted that these three branches of 
Government may exercise jurisdiction, 
international law has developed princi-
ples which limit the power. I think the 
reason that has been true, historically, is 
that nations have recognized that it is 
c~nvenient for every government to act 
on the same matter at the same time, 
although we will see that in many 
instances jurisdictions do overlap. This 
means that if a state exercises its power 
-that is, takes jurisdiction-under cir-
cumstances which international law con-
siders proper, other states have no right 
to protest. If they do protest and the 
matter is submitted to international 
adjudication, an international court will 
hold that no damages are due. 
One might point out, as an illustra-
tion here, a case which I will have 
occasion to refer to again in other 
connections, one which has become a 
very famous case, the Steamship Lotus. 
The French ship Lotus collided negli-
gently with the Turkish ship Bozkourt 
on the high seas in the Mediterranean. 
Lotus, the French ship, later put in to a 
Turkish port. The Turks arrested the 
mate in command of the French ship at 
the time the collision took place and 
were going to try him for the death of 
the Turkish citizens who were killed in 
the collision. The French protested that 
the Turks had no jurisdiction in such a 
situation, and the two countries agreed 
to refer it to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, to answer the 
specific question: Did Turkey violate 
any of the rules of international law 
regarding the proper exercise of jurisdic-
tion by a state when it asserted its 
authority to try Lieutenant Demons for 
the alleged crime of killing the Turkish 
citizens on this ship? 
In addition to these general prin-
ciples of international law governing 
jurisdiction, you have also many par-
ticular treaties which define jurisdiction, 
as in the old days we had special treaties 
providing for our extraterritorial juris-
diction in China, and under the eapitula-
tions in Turkey and elsewhere. We have 
special treaty agreements in regard to 
jurisdiction governing our forces sta-
tioned abroad under the Status of 
Forces Agreements, or our arrangements 
in particular bases which we have leased 
from other countries. 
Granted that you have this domestic 
power to exercise your jurisdiction, and 
granted that you have certain rules of 
international law which determine the 
proper limits of the exercise of that 
power when questions are raised in our 
courts-that is, in American national 
courts-where the issue is posed that the 
jurisdiction exercised by the United 
States is in violation of a rule of 
international law, the American courts 
must follow the legislative command if 
the Congress has laid down clearly a rule 
which is to be applied. But the courts 
have developed the principle that they 
will always assume that Congress did 
not intend to violate international law, 
and, therefore, if the statute can be 
reconciled with the international prin-
ciple the courts will adopt the interpre-
tation which is in accord with interna-
tionallaw. 
For example, a few years ago a case 
before the Supreme Court involved a 
statute which in general terms provided 
that any seaman suffering certain acci-
dents, would have certain remedies. The 
question was whether a Danish seaman 
serving on a Danish ship while that ship 
was in the Havana harbor could take 
advantage of that statute when the ship 
later called at New York. Then the 
Supreme Court said: "No, Congress 
clearly did not intend when it said 'any 
seaman' to mean any seaman on any 
ship anywhere in the world. They had in 
mind the normal limitations which have 
developed in the historical evolution of 
maritime law." So they placed an inter-
pretation on the statute to bring it into 
accord with international law. 
It is also true that the executive has 
in certain circumstances the authority 
under our Constituional form of govern-
ment to make the action of the United 
States comply. with the international 
rule, even though the original law 
enforcement officer is quite properly 
acting within the authority of the 
jurisdictional power laid down by 
Congress. 
For example-again, in the pro-
hibition cases-the Coast Guard arrested 
several foreign ships which were smug-
gling, or intending to smuggle, liquor 
into the United States. They were 
authorized to do so under the Act of 
Congress. But the foreign governments 
protested and said: "You cannot seize 
our ships in that place under those 
circumstances." The President, exer-
cising his executive authority, ordered 
the Attorney General not to prosecute 
the ships, but to release them. There-
fore, there was no further enforcement 
of the laws against those particular 
ships. 
Similarly where, under our draft 
laws, aliens were drafted into the Army 
and where under the statute the draft 
board had no option but to force the 
aliens into the Armed Forces-when the 
foreign governments protested on par-
ticular grounds, the President discharged 
the individuals from the Armed Forces. 
So you get a reconciliation at times-
not always-between the power of the 
United States to exercise jurisdiction in 
its territory and the rule of international 
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law, which places certain limits on that 
power. 
In international practice several legal 
bases of jurisdiction have been devel-
oped. The first of these is clearly ac-
cepted by everybody: that is the terri-
torial basis of jurisdiction, which is the 
simple proposition that the United 
States laws apply in the United States. 
This is universally accepted throughout 
the world and it is the basic system 
adopted in the law of the United States, 
of England, and of many other coun-
tries. 
Next, there is the personal theory of 
jurisdiction: the theory that you may 
exercise your power over your own 
citizens. It is based on nationality, or 
the links between the individual and the 
state. This is universally recognized in 
international law as a proper basis for 
the exercise of jurisdiction. Some of the 
laws of the United States apply to 
American citizens abroad, but it is the 
secondary basis in our law; in other 
countries it is the primary basis. In 
Italy, for instance, the personal theory 
of jurisdiction is preferred as the basic 
system over even the territorial system. 
Third, there is what is known as the 
protective theory of jurisdiction, which 
I think is clearly accepted in interna-
tional law but which has a limited 
scope. What that means is that a state 
may exercise its jurisdiction even over a 
person who is not a citizen, and even 
though the act is not committed in the 
United States, if the act is one directed 
against and affecting particular interests 
of the United States. For instance: we 
have a statute which punishes any alien 
who commits perjury in applying for a 
visa before an American consular officer 
in a foreign country. Here is a situation 
of a Frenchman, we will say, in France 
committing an act before an American 
consul The basis of our jurisdiction is 
the fact that our interest in having our 
documents properly issued is affected. 
Many other countries apply that prin-
ciple even more widely. 
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There is also the so-called "passive 
personality theory." This is not univer-
sally accepted in international law and 
has always been challenged by the 
United States. The theory here is that 
you exercise your jurisdiction on the 
basis of the nationality of the person 
who is injured-not the nationality of 
the criminal, but the nationality of the 
victim. For example, under the Turkish 
law if anyone injures a Turkish citizen 
anywhere in the world Turkey asserts 
the right to punish that individual for 
having injured a Turk. In the Lotus case, 
for example, one subsidiary element was 
the Turkish criminal statute which said: 
"We may punish anyone who injures a 
Turk. This master of the French ship 
has injured a Turk on the high seas; 
.therefore, we may punish him." That 
was one of the bases on which the Turks 
alleged their right to exercise jurisdic-
tion. The court decided the case on 
other grounds, but this factor was 
brought up. 
Then there is a very famous earlier 
case in United States history of a 
conflict with Mexico, where Mexico had 
a similar criminal statute authorizing the 
punishment of anyone who injured a 
Mexican. In this case they tried and 
prosecuted an American citizen who 
had published a libel, defaming a Mexi-
can citizen. I need not go into the 
various complexities of the case, but in 
that situation the United States strongly 
resisted the Mexican claim that they 
could exercise jurisdiction over an alien 
for an act performed outside of Mexican 
territory solely on the ground that the 
individual affected was a Mexican citi-
zen. 
Finally, there is what is called the 
"universality theory," which, again, is 
of limited acceptance in international 
law. I think that the only clear case of 
its application is in connection with 
piracy; that is, that any nation is 
privileged to try, prosecute, and punish 
a person guilty of piracy. But you do 
find some countries-again, Italy as an 
example-who take the position that if a 
crime has been committed anywhere in 
the world, anyone who catches the 
offender ought to be able to punish him 
so as to be sure that he does not escape 
justice. In most countries where that 
theory is accepted, it is hedged around 
with various limitations: such as the fact 
that no other country wishes to exercise 
a jurisdiction on the territorial principle, 
or on the personal principle, or on the 
proteetive principle, or any other princi-
ples; and that this is merely a catchall to 
prevent the possibility of a criminal 
escaping trial. The theory of it is that it 
is based merely on the custody of the 
offe~der; if you have him within your 
physical power, you ought to be able to 
try him. 
In addition to its application to 
piracy, this theory may have a useful 
application in those relatively restricted 
areas of the earth's surface which are 
not now under the sovereignty of any 
state-for instance, in Antarctica. But 
actually there, if it became a question of 
the application of some jurisdictional 
principle, a case could probably be 
handled on the basis of the personal 
theory of jurisdiction. 
There are one or two special applica-
tions of the territorial principle which I 
want to mention. First, where an act is 
performed outside the territory and 
takes effect inside the territory; for 
instance, if a Mexican standing on the 
Mexican side of our frontier shoots 
across the border and kills an American 
in the United States, we assert the right 
to exercise our jurisdiction on the terri-
torial principle. Although the murderer 
was not in the United States, neverthe-
less his act takes effect in the United 
States. Again, that was one of the bases 
of the decision of the International 
Court in the Lotus case; namely, that 
the act set in motion on the French ship 
through negligent navigation took effect 
on the Turkish ship, resulting in the 
injury to Turks on the Turkish ship. As 
we will see, a ship is for certain purposes 
assimilated to territory; therefore, the 
Turks said that even on the territorial 
principle they were entitled to take 
jurisdiction because the act took effect 
on their ship, which was assimilated to 
their territory. 
Just as a footnote on that, the 
maritime community did not at all like 
the principle that the officer of a ship 
causing a collision of this kind should be 
tried in any port where his ship later 
came in. They felt that jurisdiction 
should be exercised only by the flag 
state; that is, by the state whose flag the 
vessel was flying of which the officer 
was in command. In 1952, a number of 
maritime states drew up a treaty at 
Brussels, providing that in the future 
they would agree that in such collision 
cases jurisdiction would be exercised 
only by the flag state. That rule in the 
Brussels Convention is now recom-
mended by the International Law Com-
mission of the United Nations for uni-
versal adoption, but this is a matter for 
treaty agreement 
The second special application of the 
territorial principle is merely the reverse 
situation: where a person inside the 
territory puts into motion a force which 
results in injury outside the territory. 
For example, Brazil punished a man 
who put a time bomb on a British ship 
when that ship was in a Brazilian port, 
although the time bomb did not go off 
until the ship was on the high seas. But 
the Brazilians said: "The putting of the 
bomb on the ship in our territory, 
though the act took effect outside, gives 
us jurisdiction on the territorial 
theory. " 
Along with these general bases of 
jurisdiction, there are certain excep-
tions, or immunities. For instance, our 
laws are not enforced against foreign 
ambassadors, or in a foreign embassy, or 
in the headquarters of the United 
Nations. Our laws are not enforced 
against a foreign warship in a United 
States port These are exceptions 
stemming from international law. 
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Similarly, our laws are not enforced 
against a foreign state, or against its 
instrumentality, subject to certain ex-
ceptions which I shall not go into. 
A further exception found in interna-
tional law is the exception of distress. 
When a vessel comes into territorial 
waters or into a foreign port in distress, 
being forced in by damaged machinery, 
a shortage of provisions or water, or 
various things of that kind, the local 
state is not entitled under international 
law to exercise the jurisdiction which 
would normally be attached. As we shall 
see in more detail later, when a ship is 
passing in innocent passage through 
foreign territorial waters the jurisdiction 
of the local state which normally 
attaches is limited. 
Now a word on what is included in 
the territory over which a state has 
jurisdiction. For instance, in regard to 
the United States-what are the places 
where the United States exercises this 
power without valid international objec-
tion? Clearly, all the land area of the 
United States and the islands belonging 
to it, its inland waters, lakes, and rivers 
within our frontiers; the territorial 
waters along our coast (we will define 
these later); the air space above this land 
and these waters; similarly, now, by a 
special arrangement, the trust territories 
which are placed under our control and 
bases over which we exercise jurisdic-
tion under certain treaties; and then, as 
I have indicated, by a fiction, interna-
tional law accepts the idea that every 
state exercises what is called "territorial 
jurisdiction" over its ships, wherever 
they may be. Courts do not like that 
fiction-they would rather explain the 
rule in different ways. For instance: the 
Supreme Court said that the national 
Prohibition Act, which forbids the 
carrying of liquors in American terri-
tory, was not applicable to the carriage 
of liquors on an American ship on the 
high seas-they would not push the 
fiction of territoriality that far. Then 
another court pointed out, to reduce it 
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to an absurdity, that no one contended 
as a ship sailed across the high seas it 
was surrounded by a belt of territorial 
waters as it moved from one continent 
to another. The "territorial jurisdiction" 
theory has a limited utility-in history, 
at least-in extending jurisdiction over 
ships. 
Who are included in the persons over 
whom we have jurisdiction when they 
, are not in our territory? Under our law 
such jurisdiction is limited to our citi-
zens, or the nationals of the United 
States; to American corporations; and, 
in some cases, to seamen serving on 
American ships, even where they do not 
have American nationality. 
Clearly, as I suggested before, there 
are cases of proper dual or multiple 
jurisdiction. For instance: if an Italian 
commits murder in the United States, 
the United States has jurisdiction on the 
territorial theory and Italy has jurisdic-
tion on the personal theory. You can 
multiply the complexities. If the mur-
derer has dual nationality-for instance, 
he may be both an Italian and a 
Greek-you may add another state 
which has jurisdiction on the personal 
theory. Similarly, if a crime is com-
mitted on a United States ship in a 
British port there is a duality of terri-
tory, so to speak: it being in a British 
port, the British have jurisdiction under 
the territorial theory; it being on an 
American ship, the United States may 
validly exercise its jurisdiction on the 
theory that the act was committed on 
the American ship. 
In general in these cases of dual 
jurisdiction you can say that he who 
has, gets; that is, the man will probably 
be tried where he is caught. That state 
will have precedence because the police 
of one state can not exercise their 
authority in another state. On the other 
hand, in certain situations the criminal 
may be transferred from the state where 
he is apprehended to another state 
which has a basis for trying him through 
the process known as "extradition." We 
might just note in passing that where 
the individual is not in your territory 
and you do not actually have him in 
your physical power, you can neverthe-
less proceed against him and exercise 
your jurisdiction on the personal theory 
by controlling his property. So under 
one of our statutes a man named Black-
mer, who was wanted in the United 
States under a statute requiring people 
to testify in certain government pro-
ceedings-and where he refused to 
come-was fined by the American 
courts $60,000, which was collected out 
of his property in the United States. So 
even though you do not have the man, 
in your power there are ways in which 
you can punish him and influence his 
conduct. 
I have been talking generally about 
criminal jurisdiction. The problem of 
civil jurisdiction is one in which interna-
tional law leaves to each state a much 
wider and freer choice. For instance, 
our courts may deal with the contracts 
made between two Frenchmen in 
France in regard to conduct to be 
performed in France. Under our law, 
the question of our civil jurisdiction 
depends usually on the service of a 
summons or the attachment of property 
which is completed within our jurisdic-
tion. In the admiralty field in suits 
against a ship, you can follow the ship 
allover the world and wherever the ship 
comes in you may proceed in a civil suit 
against that particular vessel. Without 
going into more of the details on those 
questions of civil jurisdiction, let me 
return to the problem of territorial 
jurisdiction to point out one other 
aspect of the situation. 
In general there is no problem in 
determining which land territory is sub-
ject to which state, but you do have 
disputed frontiers. Therefore, you may 
have a border area in which it is not 
clear which state exercises jurisdiction 
lawfully under international law. We are 
seeing that at the moment in the new 
flare-up of the border dispute between 
Ecuador and Peru. Many other cases will 
occur to you. Even in recent times there 
are disputes as to the fundamental title 
to a particular territory. These titles are 
frequently adjudicated in international 
courts, as we adjudicated with the 
Netherlands the sovereignty over, or 
title to, the small island of Palm as in the 
Philippine Archipelago; as Norway and 
Denmark arbitrated sovereignty over 
eastern Greenland; and, just recently, as 
France and England have submitted to 
the International Court jurisdiction over 
some small islands in the English Chan-
nel, which the court decided belonged 
to England. At present, the main area of 
disputed sovereignty is Antarctica, 
where the United States does not recog-
nize any of the numerous claims which 
have been asserted by a group of states. 
But the real problem in determining 
what is the territorial jurisdiction comes 
up when you get to territorial waters. 
The problem of territorial waters arises, 
historically, at a period in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries when nations 
were claiming vast areas of the high seas 
and saying: "These are ours"-and 
these claims were being resisted. Gradu-
ally, it narrowed down to the idea that 
it was perfectly reasonable to have a 
certain belt of water around our coast 
for the purpose of protecting our inter-
ests, even though we now admit that the 
high seas arc free and common to 
everybody. So, developing in the seven-
tcentll and eighteenth centuries, there 
began to crystallize the rule of terri-
torial waters. 
It has long been asserted that the 
tllree-mile rule-which is the rule that 
the United States now supports and has 
always supported-was based on the 
range of cannon in the eighteenth cen-
tury, when the three-mile rule began to 
take shape. I think that recent historical 
searches have shown that that was not 
the origin. But in any case this proved 
to be a reasonable limit, and so it came 
to have a very general acceptance for a 
time. One thing was clear-and still is 
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clear-that everyone agrees, and that all 
countries agree, that there is really a 
territorial sea and that this territorial sea 
is part of your territory just as much as 
your land area. But there is much 
disagreement now as to where the terri-
torial sea ends and the high seas begin. 
Since the national frontier, or bound-
ary, ends not on the low-water mark of 
the coast but at some point out in the 
sea, at the edge of your territorial 
waters, and since the boundaries of 
territorial waters are now in dispute, 
you have in a sense a disputed frontier 
for every maritime state because not 
everyone agrees as to the point at which 
that frontier is to be drawn on the high 
seas parallel to the coast. 
Before discussing the exact nature of 
the boundaries, we should note that not 
all jurisdiction stops at this maritime 
frontier-that is, at the edge of terri-
torial waters-the way it stops at a land 
frontier. It is clear when you go to the 
Canadian or Mexican boundaries that 
you have ended the territory of the 
United States, gotten into another terri-
tory, and that territorial jurisdiction 
stops. But when you get out to the edge 
of territorial waters and get on the high 
seas, international law does not say that 
all your jurisdiction stops because it is 
agreed that there are certain types of 
jurisdiction which you may exercise on 
the high seas. We will see that the state 
may have a larger claim to jurisdiction 
in the high seas adjacent to its territorial 
waters, although outside them. 
Going back to this question of the 
boundaries between territorial waters 
and the high seas, the United States has 
from the beginning of its history ac-
cepted the three-mile rule. So has Eng-
land and a very large portion of the 
great maritime powers. The logic of the 
United States argument, today, is 
clear because as you go out from shore 
you get out one mile and say: "Un-
der international law is this clearly 
U.S. territory?"-and everybody says: 
"Yes. " 
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You go out two miles and say: "Is 
this U.S. territory?"-and everybody 
says: "Yes." 
You go out 2.9 miles and say: "Is 
this U.S. territory?"-again, universal 
agreement: "Yes." 
But you get out to 3.5 miles and say: 
"Is this U.S. territory?"-immediately, 
you get a divergence of opinion among 
the governments of the world. 
So up to three miles it is universally 
agreed that you are in territorial waters. 
When you pass beyond the three-mile 
limit, you begin to get into an area of 
disagreement This disagreement goes 
back a long way. For instance, the 
Russian twelve-mile claim goes back to 
about 1911, and was vigorously op-
posed in the early period by Japan and 
the United Kingdom particularly. In 
1921, for instance, a British trawler was 
seized by the Russians ten miles out 
from the Russian coast. A British war-
ship was sent to the waters off 
Archangel. According to a statement by 
the British Government in the House of 
Commons, it was sent there for fishery 
protection duties-"Our orders are to 
prevent interference with British vessels 
outside the three-mile limit, using force 
if necessary." The Soviet Government 
has had an agreement with Great 
Britain, a treaty agreement, allowing 
British ships to fish up to three miles 
from the Russian coast-but the Soviets 
have now given notice that they are not 
going to continue that agreement. 
You have many of these disputes. 
You have the dispute currently between 
Japan and Korea, where Korea has 
drawn the so-called "Syngman Rhee 
Line," extending in many cases one 
hundred miles off the Korean coast. By 
the end of 1953, the official Japanese 
report was that the Koreans had 
arrested 142 Japanese fishing vessels and 
1,788 Japanese fishermen for tres-
passing on what the Koreans assert are 
Korean waters and which the Japanese, 
following our same rule of the three-
mile limit, insist are the high seas. 
The International Law Commission 
of the United Nations has been trying to 
grapple with this problem and see if 
they could find an agreement. They 
have finally come up this year with the 
suggestion that international law does 
not require recognition more than three 
miles out, but that any state (they 
suggest) should be privileged to set its 
territorial waters as far out as twelve 
miles. This is frankly advanced still as a 
matter of suggestion, without any 
assurance of agreement. 
Meanwhile you will find, for in-
stance, that on the west coast of South 
America, Chile, Peru and Ecuador have 
all adopted rules claiming two hundred 
miles off their coasts, and they have 
concluded a treaty among themselves 
agreeing that they will maintain this 
rule. 
The Scandinavian countries have a 
special situation, in which they tradi-
tionally claim four miles. But, here, one 
might note that there is in the literature 
a good deal of confusion about the 
length of a mile. For instance, the 
Norwegian order of 1906 speaks of the 
ordinary sea mile as 7,529 meters, or 
4,065 mean nautical miles, or .468 
statute miles. A good deal of the con-
fusion about the Scandinavian claims 
has been due to a different terminology. 
We find, however, that Norway has set 
up a special claim to the measurement 
of waters, based on the particular con-
figuration of its coast. 
In general, it is the big maritime 
powers that have stuck by the three-
mile limit. They are the ones that 
control the high seas in a sense, and, 
therefore, the wider the high seas the 
larger the area in which they exercise a 
certain control through their maritime 
power; whereas the weak maritime 
powers are naturally interested in having 
the widest possible belt of territorial 
waters in which their national authority 
will be recognized. 
This issue has been particularly acute 
in connection with fisheries. Here, the 
United States has a mixed interest. We 
have important fisheries off our own 
eoasts from whieh we want to exclude 
foreigners. But we also have important 
fishing interests off foreign eoasts-off 
Mexieo, off Peru, and off Canada-and 
we are interested in having our fisher-
men get as close as possible to those 
coasts. The answer in international prac-
tice is frequently through special treaty 
agreements. 
But fisheries are not the only interest 
for which you need the rule of terri-
torial waters. You must protect yourself 
against smuggling, against hostile forces, 
and in earlier days-particularly in the 
historical development of the United 
States-the emphasis was upon the en-
forcement of our neutrality laws and 
our neutral duties in time of war. 
We will also see later that since the 
territorial claim includes the air over 
territorial waters, we now need to con-
sider whether three miles of air space 
off our coast is satisfactory. I think that 
generally, the situation is one in which 
for a long time, an old rule met the 
needs of the international community, 
but does not seem to do so now. I am 
inclined to think that if the question 
went to the International Court of 
Justice in a broad form today that they 
would be inclined to uphold a claim of 
six, ten, or twelve miles if that claim 
had been asserted over a reasonable 
period of time. But I doubt very much 
if they would support the two-hundred-
mile claim of the countries on the west 
coast of South America. 
The State Department, however, is 
still very clear in maintaining its in-
sistence on the three-mile limit. For 
instance, they asserted this claim very 
emphatically to the Soviet government 
when, in 1953, the Soviets shot down a 
B-50 off Cape Povorotny. We insisted 
that the three-mile limit was the only 
limit that we were bound to accept, 
although we were warning our aviators 
to stay at least twelve miles off the 
Soviet coast. 
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But in any case, let me repeat, 
somewhere there is a line between terri-
torial waters and the high seas. I have 
been talking about the difficulty of 
measuring the boundary between the 
territorial waters and the high seas 
themselves. There is another problem 
of measuring the point at which you 
begin, and I think that we can 
perhaps see that by looking at 
several illustrations. 
The general agreement has been in 
the past that you start at a low-water 
mark and that you carry your three-mile 
limit in a line parallel to the low-water 
mark-in our case, three miles from the 
coast. I am going to call your attention 
to the fact that we have the twelve-mile 
limit of customs waters; we have the air 
zone (which I shall come to later); and 
then we have the further sixty-to-
ninety-mile customs enforcement zone. 
Our general position had heen to draw 
the three-mile limit parallel to the coast. 
(See plate one) 
On the other hand in Norway, wher:e 
there was a peculiar configuration of 
many little rocky islets and deep fjords 
indenting the coast, the Norwegian in-
sisted that you could not have a line 
which moved in and out from all of 
these little minute points; that they 
were entitled to draw a general hase 
line, connecting the points shown by 
the dotted line there. Then you measure 
your territorial waters four miles out 
from the hase line (in their case, under 
their historic claim, four rather than 
three miles) rather than from the low-
water mark. The Norwegian claim was 
contested by England and submitted to 
the International Court of Justice, 
which decided that under the particular 
circumstances of the case the Norwegian 
claim was sound in international law. 
(See plate two) 
Iceland, which has had a long, tough 
struggle to preserve its fishing indus-
try-particularly against the intrusion of 
British fishermen-trying to take ad-
vantage of the decision of the Court in 
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the Norwegian case, has similarly 
adopted the idea of base lines; but, here, 
extending over rather wide indentations 
of the coast-squaring off the coast, so 
to speak-and then drawing their limit 
of national waters within which fishery 
is an Icelandic monopoly three miles 
out from that base line. (See plate 
three) 
So we actually have, at the moment, 
no complete agreement as to how this 
line is to be measured in all cases. The 
International Law Commission, again, 
has approved the rule suggested in the 
decision of the Court in the Norwegian 
case. 
The United States, in terms of our 
basic rule of measuring the line three 
miles from low-water mark, has pre-
ferred the method of measurement of 
arcs and circles; that is, the intersecting 
arcs of all circles drawn with the same 
radius from all points of the base line. 
The advantage of this is that a ship can 
determine easily whether it is in terri-
torial waters. If the ship is in the center, 
you draw a circle of a given radius; if 
the circle at any point touches the land, 
you are within territorial waters-if not, 
you are outside on the high seas. But 
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the International Court of Justice did 
not admit that this method was estab-
lished in international law. 
As other minor points in the mea-
surement question, each island has its 
own territorial waters. The International 
Law Commission has taken the position, 
with some justification, that a light-
house built on rocks-artificially built 
up above high water-does not consti-
tute an island with its own belt of 
territorial waters. We are having to 
consider now the problem of our radar 
platforms off the American coast and 
the oil-drilling platforms which are also 
being set up on the high seas. As far as I 
know, we are not making any claim that 
those are islands which have their own 
territorial waters around them. I will 
refer later to the special problem that 
arises there. 
There is a similar argument in the 
measurement of territorial waters in 
bays, on which no general agreement 
has been reached. An attempt has been 
made to get a ten-mile rule; that is, if 
the bay is not more than ten miles wide 
at the mouth it is a territorial bay. The 
International Law Commission has sug-
gested, here, a twenty-five mile rule. 
~) 
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Then, again, there are "historic bays," 
so-called-bays like the Chesapeake-
where over a long period of time, a 
country has asserted that these are 
national waters, and where others have 
consented. 
So much for details on the question 
of measurement. Let's go on to the 
problem of what kind of jurisdiction a 
state is entitled to exercise on the high 
seas outside the territorial waters. 
The general principle was laid down 
by Chief Justice Marshall in a case as 
long ago as 1804, where he said that a 
state's power is not confined to its 
territory and that it can protect itself by 
exercising certain authority outside. If 
what it does is reasonable, other states 
will consent; if it is unreasonable, they 
will object. This was an expression of a 
general right of self-defense, but it has 
become a rather classic statement in this 
connection. We have acted on this since 
the earliest days of our history by the 
customs enforcement zone, which you 
saw on that chart. We applied this 
twelve miles out from shore but, under 
our earlier legislation, only for ships 
bound for the United States. In pro-
hibition days, we included all ships-
whether bound for our ports or not. 
Foreign governments were objecting, so 
we finally concluded treaties with a 
large number of them providing that 
ships could be seized if they were within 
one hour's sail as measured by their own 
speed or the speed of their small boats 
from our coast. This was adopted be-
cause the British did not want to agree 
on any mileage limit which might 
weaken the three-mile principle. Then, 
in 1935, we passed the Anti-Smuggling 
Act, which authorizes the President in 
certain cases to establish customs en-
forcement areas as much as sixty-two 
miles off the coast. 
A great many other countries have 
similar laws providing for the enforce-
ment of custom laws within an ex-
tended zone of the high seas-usually, 
around twelve miles. 
The United States has always empha-
sized the fact that our claim here is a 
claim to certain jurisdiction on the high 
seas for our protection, and that this is 
not a claim to territorial waters. The 
failure to understand that basie point, 
and to accept it in other countries, has 
been at the root of a great deal of the 
trouble and of the disagreement. 
Similarly, in time of war, countries 
have set up special zones for their 
protection under war conditions and for 
the defense of neutrality. Your Law 
Instructions for Naval Warfare point out 
some of these cases. The most extreme 
case is the Declaration of Panama in 
1939, in which the Latin American 
Republics joined with us in setting up a 
zone which extended some three 
hundred miles off the tip of South 
America and some twelve hundred miles 
off Florida. The belligerents did not 
accept it, and it was never really en-
forced. 
In 1945, the United States started a 
movement which has had unexpected 
repercussions. In that year, the President 
issued two Executive Orders. The first 
was an order on the continental shelf. 
The continental shelf, of course, is the 
sloping projection beyond the eoast, 
which goes until it falls into the deep of 
the sea. There have been old cases involv-
ing pearl fisheries, sponge fisheries, and 
even coal mines extending out under the 
bed of the sea. But it was only recently 
that it was found that it was possible to 
exploit petroleum resources by drilling in 
the continental shelf, a considerable 
number of miles out. 
So we issued these decrees, or execu-
tive orders, and we said that every statc 
had a right to exploit its natural re-
sources in the continental shelf. We said 
that these natural resources appertained 
to the United States and were subject to 
its jurisdiction and control. But we also 
said that this was not a claim to 
extending territorial waters; that the 
waters on top are high seas, free to 
navigation by all. 
That was followed immediately by 
other states who misinterpreted our 
proclamation. They said we had claimed 
sovereignty over all the waters over the 
continental shelf; therefore, they 
claimed sovereignty. The Argentines 
were the first to follow this, and it was 
rapidly followed by a lot of Latin 
American States. It has now been fol-
lowed by states on the Persian Gulf, 
where the geophysical formation is 
quite different. You now have a welter 
of claims based on this idea of the claim 
to the continental shelf. 
Here, thc International Law Commis-
sion has been trying to grapple with the 
definition by setting the boundary ac-
cording to the depth of the water on the 
continental shelf. They have been talk-
ing about a depth of two hundred 
meters, which would define the limits 
within which you could exercise this 
jurisdiction. We may note that the 
Syngman Rhee Line, established by the 
Korean Proclamation of 1952, specifi-
cally says their claim is irrespective of 
the depth of the water. This is a very 
real problem. 
Our oil companies are now building 
drilling platforms as much as thirty 
miles out in the Gulf of Mexico. We 
claim that they have a right to do that, 
but we do not claim that as our terri-
tory. Other countries are going to bt 
following suit in the Persian Gulf and 
clsewhere, so you have opened up a vast 
area here in which the rules still need to 
be worked out in the international 
community. But I think that the general 
proposition of the right to exploit the 
resources in the continental shelf is 
firmly established-I think everybody 
agrees to that. The difference is between 
the claim to exercise a limited jurisdic-
tion on what is still recognized to be 
high seas, or under high seas, as against 
the extreme Peruvian, Chilean and 
Ecuadorian claims that the territory of 
the states extends out two hundred 
miles over this continental shelf. 
There are various other special rights 
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in the adjacent seas, but I haven't time 
to go into them in detail. I merely 
mention particularly the right of hot 
pursuit-where, if you begin pursuing a 
ship in your territorial water, and follow 
it out on the high seas, you may 
complete the capture on the high seas. 
Let me turn now to the question of 
jurisdiction over ships; first, foreign 
merchant ships in port. Here, there is 
supposed to be a disagreement between 
the Anglo-American theory and the 
Continental Europe theory. Our theory 
is that when a foreign merchant ship 
comes into one of our ports it is 
completely subject to our jurisdiction. 
But, we say we will not bother to 
exercise that jurisdiction in minor mat-
ters, such as disciplinary measures taken 
by the captain in the case of the crew. 
On the other hand the Continental 
theory has said the ships are immune, 
but the local state may exercise jurisdic-
tion if the peace of the port is affected, 
or if the act affects the persons on shore 
or on another ship, or if the captain of 
the ship asks for help. 
Practically, the result is the -same in 
most cases. But it seems to me thatthe 
American theory of complete jurisdic-
tion over a foreign merchant ship in 
port is sound in international law. You 
will also find that many treaties have 
been concluded to allow the local con-
sular officers to take jurisdiction over 
wage disputes among the crew, for 
example. However, as I have noted, you 
do have concurrent jurisdiction in cases 
where events take place on a foreign 
merchant ship in port-the local state 
where the p'ort is 1geated has jurisdic-
tion, and so has the state of the ship in 
question. In these cases the warship, as I 
have noted, is immune from local juris-
diction. 
As you get out from a port itself into 
the territorial waters the interest of 
local state is less, but this is the territory 
of the state-and the state is still en-
titled to exercise its jurisdiction. The 
International Law Commission has 
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suggested some limitation there in line 
with the traditional European theory 
about the peace of the port and the 
effect on other ships or persons. 
There is one particular right which 
we ought to note in connection with 
ships in territorial waters, and that is the 
right of innocent passage. Traditionally, 
I think it has always been thought of as 
the case of a ship sailing from State A to 
State B, which, in the course of normal 
navigation, passes through the waters of 
State C. This old right to pass in the 
normal channels of navigation has been 
recognized in international law. The 
coastal state cannot deny this right of 
innocent passage-that is clear. The only 
question is this: What authority may the 
state exercise over a ship in course of 
innocent passage? I think that the Inter-
national Law Commission in its sugges-
tions goes rather far in authorizing this 
jurisdiction over these vessels. It seems 
to me that the sound rule is to leave 
them as free as possible, and for the 
local state to exercise jurisdiction only 
where its interests are really vitally 
effected. 
Another question in connection with 
innocent passage is whether a warship 
has the right to exercise innocent 
passage. The old American rule, as 
stated by Secretary of State Elihu Root, 
was the "merchant ships may pass be-
cause they do not threaten; warships 
may not pass because they do 
threaten." The International Law Com-
mission, however, says that warships do 
have a right of innocent passage. The 
question came up in the International 
Court in the Corfu Channel case, but 
the Court confined itself to saying that 
warships have the right of passage 
through an international strait, and did 
not pass on the British claim that they 
had a general right of innocent passage. 
In connection with maritime law, I 
want to deal with one particular set of 
problems which is important now on 
the high seas. We have noted that, 
generally, a state has jurisdiction over its 
ships and it has jurisdiction in its con-
tiguous waters for its own protection; 
that in general there is no authority over 
a foreign ship on the high seas except in 
cases of piracy or under special treaties. 
We have recently found that this issue 
has involved the question of a real 
authority exercised by the United States 
over large areas of the high seas. 
For instance, in 1950 we made an 
agreement with Great Britain for the 
Bahamas Long-Range Proving Ground 
for the testing of guided missiles. The 
launching area is in Florida and the 
zone, as defined in the treaty, goes 
southeast through the Bahamas down to 
a point opposite Haiti. The agreement 
elaborately provides, in regard to the 
rights of the United States in the use of 
it, that the United States agrees to 
compensate those who are injured 
through its use of the zone. It says that 
it will not unreasonably exercise its 
rights so as to interfere with, or preju-
dice, safety of navigation, aviation, or 
eommunication within the flight-testing 
range. This has been in existence now 
for five years, and was amplified some-
what by an agreement in 1953. So far as 
I know, no foreign state has objected. 
Then came the question of the 
Proving Grounds for atomic bombs, 
and, later, for hydrogen bombs in the 
Pacifie. In your readings there is a 
suggestion of an interesting spirited de-
fense of the right of the United States 
here by MeDougal and Schlei in the 
Yale Law Journal. As they point out, 
the first tests here were conducted in 
1946-and 180,000 square miles of seas 
with islands in them were defined as an 
area that people had to keep out of 
because it was a danger zone. The area 
has varied in the warnings issued since 
that time until, in the test of the 
H-bomb in March, 1954, the warning 
area covered 400,000 square miles. 
It is to be noted that alI of the orders 
were withdrawn after fifty-seven days; 
in other words, we were not perma-
nently closing this area. It is also to be 
noted that there are not main navigation 
routes through this area, nor is there 
any particular fishery of importance 
within the area. Nevertheless, as you 
know, through certain miscalculations 
in the fall-out and in the winds, Japa-
nese fishermen (in one vessel in particu-
lar) suffered from radioactive effects, 
the fish were alleged to be affected, and 
the United States paid two million 
dollars to Japan-not with any admis-
sion of liability, but in order to settle it. 
Comparable to our claim is the 
Australian Proclamation of 1953, which 
set up a prohibited area of 6,000 square 
miles surrounding the Monte Bello 
Islands. I noticed in The New York 
Times this morning that further tests are 
to be carried out there. 
These claims of controlling people on 
the high seas are very extensive and 
there are very few precedents for them. 
It seems to me that McDougal is right in 
stressing the element of reasonableness 
and going back to the old test which 
Marshall advanced in another connec-
tion in 1804. I do not think that you 
can generalize about them-you have 
got to study the particular situation; 
then test it on the ground of reasonable-
ness, the interests of the country 
utilizing this area, and the interests of 
others adversely affected thereby. 
Finally, one or two moments on the 
question of jurisdiction in air space. 
Prior to 1914, there was little govern-
mental interest in this; it was largely left 
to scholars. They had a lovely time 
speculating about who owned the air 
space. They finally came out, by 
analogy to the high seas, by saying: "Of 
course the air is free, but everybody has 
a bclt of territorial space. This belt is as 
much as you need for protection. All 
you need is the height of your highest 
building. " 
At the time these talks went on the 
Eiffel Tower was the tallest building, so 
they took that height. They said that 
everybody could build or control the air 
spaces as high above the ground as the 
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Eiffel Tower. Above that, the air was 
free. World War I changed all of that 
with the development of the use of 
aircraft. Immediately after the end of 
the war all the states, with remarkable 
unanimity and speed, agreed that every 
state is sovereign over its air space, and, 
as the phrase went, "up to the skies." 
Nobody stopped or bothered at that 
time to define where the skies ended or 
where they began. 
Nowadays, we are getting into more 
discussion of the ionosphere, and people 
are beginning to worry about jurisdic-
tion over satellites floating around the 
earth. All that I can say is: if you find 
yourself in command of a satellite in the 
ionosphere and you encounter a Soviet 
satellite, you had better send back for 
instructions because the law books will 
not help you any. 
You will find, in general, that air law 
has developed by analogy from the 
maritime law. For instance: just as you 
have the principle of the nationality of 
ships in jurisdiction over ships, you have 
nationality of aircraft. On the other 
hand, the principle of innocent passage, 
which developed in maritime law for 
rather clear reasons, was denied in con-
nection with air law-that is not estab-
lished, so that the right of entry, land-
ing, or overflight depends entirely upon 
treaties. I think that one can say, as 
Professor Lissitzyn argues, that there is 
a right of entry in distress, as argued by 
the United States in our claims against 
Yugoslavia when they shot down Ameri-
can planes. Perhaps we find another 
example in the recent Bulgarian incident 
in the shooting down of the Israeli 
craft-although that may have been 
merely a confession of error. 
This air space, then, is now generally 
conceived to be part of the territory of 
the state just as much as the land or the 
territorial waters; it extends up above 
the territory and it extends above the 
territorial waters. But, just as in the case 
of territorial waters and further jurisdic-
tion on the high seas, so we find that 
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states are asserting jurisdiction in the air 
space adjacent to their boundaries but 
out over the high seas. The United 
States and Canada have met this by the 
Proclamation of the A.D.LZ., (the Air 
Defense Identification Zones). You will 
remember that on the slide of the U.S. 
coast there was a far line a way out. Our 
A.D.I.Z. line extends some hundreds of 
miles off our coast in some places, and 
the Canadian line is somewhat closer. 
All aircraft entering these zones· are 
required to report and to comply with 
certain rules and instructions, but we do 
not forbid foreign aircraft to fly into 
these zones. The C.A.A. has stated in a 
letter that foreign aircraft bound, for 
example, from Havana to Halifax, not 
approaching the United States, do not 
need to comply with the regulations in 
the zone. But, query whether we would 
tolerate Soviet military aircraft flying 
within ten or twelve miles of our coast-
although we would admit they are 
flying over the high seas. We insist that 
our airmen have the right to fly up to 
within three miles of the Soviet coast, 
although as a practical matter we tell 
them to keep twelve miles out Is this a 
situation where the United States, as a 
great air power following its tradition of 
the narrow belt of territorial waters, is 
also seeking to establish the rule of the 
narrow belt of air space over territorial 
waters, and a limited right of authority 
in air space out over the high seas? I 
suggest that this is a problem which 
needs· very serious consideration in the 
American Government: as to whether 
the interests of the United States are 
still to be promoted by an insistence on 
the three-mile rule of territorial waters 
and by insistence on very restricted 
rights in the super-adjacent air space 
over the high seas off our maritime 
frontiers. 
I think that one will find that with 
the increased compactness of the world, 
the speed of communication, and the 
rapidity with which these problems are 
advancing, the development of the law 
in these respects will probably be 
more rapid in the future than in the 
past. 
----tp----
